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ABSTRACT 
Modern portfolio theory states that investments with greater beta, a common 
measure of risk, require greater returns from investors in order to compensate them for 
taking greater risk.  Therefore, under the premise that market participants act rationally 
and therefore markets run efficiently, investments with higher beta should generate 
higher returns vis-à-vis investments with lower beta over the long run.  In fact, many 
studies suggest that investments with lower beta actually generate equal to or higher 
returns relative to investments with higher beta.  In looking at data for the S&P 500 going 
back 22 years between 1990 and 2012, this study found that there was very low 
correlation between beta and returns.  In fact, portfolios with very low risk generated 
commensurate to better returns versus portfolios with very high beta.  Therefore, we find 
that beta appears to be a poor measure of risk as it relates to the stock market.   
 
In addition to beta and returns, this study looked at the fundamental 
characteristics of each company specifically corporate profitability and balance sheet 
leverage which are commonly used by investors in assessing the underlying quality of a 
company.   We find that companies with higher levels of return on equity combined with 
lower levels of balance sheet leverage tend to outperform companies with lower levels of 
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profitability and higher balance sheet leverage.  As a result, we find a high correlation 
between balance sheet leverage, ROE and stock returns.  This paper suggests that in fact, 
fundamental factors such as leverage and ROE tend to be better measures of risk vis-à-vis 
beta.  One important final observation is the fact that while in general, companies with 
high ROEs and low leverage tend to outperform companies with low profitability and 
high leverage, portfolios of those companies with the highest ROE and lowest leverage 
and portfolios of those companies with the lowest ROE and highest leverage actually 
underperform on the whole other portfolios.  In other words, portfolios of companies that 
exhibit the most extreme of characteristics in terms of ROE and leverage underperform 
portfolios of companies with more moderate characteristics.   
 
One plausible explanation for these observations is rooted in behavioral economic theory 
known as the favorite long shot bias and the opposite favorite long shot bias.  The 
opposite favorite long shot bias suggests that market participants tend to “over-bet” an 
asset and/or an investment with high probability of a payoff but low overall return if the 
payoff occurs (ie the sure bet).  In fact, market participants go so far to secure a payoff 
that they actually place a higher bet on the probability of success than the actual odds 
would suggest.  In stock market terms, investors will tend to over-value the least-riskiest 
stocks to the point where risk and return is no longer favorable.  Similar phenomenon can 
be observed in horse race betting and sports drafts.  The favorite long shot bias is the 
inverse of the opposite favorite longshot bias.  This theory suggests that market 
participants actually “over bet” an asset and/or an investment with the lowest probability 
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of a payoff but with significant overall returns if the payoff occurs.  Similar phenomenon 
takes place in the purchase of insurance to insure against large potential losses with small 
probabilities as well as lottery ticket purchases.   
 
We see the most striking evidence of this when looking at the returns of stocks 
with the highest ROEs and the lowest levels of debt/capital as of 1990.  In that year, 
investors would have based their investments in stocks using current attributes at that 
time.  We can see that stocks with the highest ROEs and lowest levels of debt/capital 
garner higher valuations relative to the broad stock market.  We also see that stocks with 
the lowest ROEs and highest debt/capital also command premium valuations to the 
market as a whole.  Therefore, risk-averse investors will tend to overvalue companies 
with the least risky prospects while risk loving investors will tend to overvalue 
companies with the riskiest prospects at the same time.  As a result, we can see from 
looking at the future returns that companies that exhibit extreme characteristics in terms 
of ROE and debt/capital tend to underperform the broad market.  Similar to high profile 
athletes and horse track betting, we find that investors tend to over-bet sure shot 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Examining the Capital Asset Pricing Model ........................................................................1 
 
The Empirical Evidence Surrounding CAPM and BETA ...................................................2 
 
Finding Other Measurements for Stock Risk.......................................................................3 
 
The Role of Analysts’ Forecasts in Stock Price Volatility ..................................................4 
 
Behavioral Explanations for the Low Volatility Anomaly ..................................................5 
 
Coexistence of the Favorite and Opposite Favorite Longshot Bias .....................................6 
 
















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Capital Asset Pricing Model........................................................................... Pg 5 
Figure 2: Capital Asset Pricing Model – Expected vs Actual ..................................... Pg 10 
Figure 3: Beta vs Returns over 22 years ...................................................................... Pg 17 
Figure 4: Portfolio Performance ranked by Deciles .................................................... Pg 18 
Figure 5: Portfolio Returns sorted by Beta .................................................................. Pg 19 
Figure 6: Frazzini and Pederson - Distribution of US Equity Returns ........................ Pg 20 
Figure 7: Relative Performance of Low-Risk vs High Risk Stocks ............................ Pg 27 
Figure 8: Portfolio Returns ranked by Debt/Capital Ratios ......................................... Pg 32 
Figure 9: Pertfolio Returns ranked by Average ROEs ................................................. Pg 33 
Figure 10: Portfolios ranked by Return - Frequency of EPS Surprise ......................... Pg 38 
Figure 11: Portfolios Ranked by Negative EPS Surprises ........................................... Pg 41 
Figure 12: Portfolios Ranked by Lowest Deviation from EPS Forecasts .................... Pg 41 
Figure 13: Ziemba and Hausch – Effective Track Payback ........................................ Pg 48 
Figure 14: Hypothetical Value Function for Gains and Losses ................................... Pg 56 
Figure 15: 1990 ROE vs Future 22 Year Returns ........................................................ Pg 59 
Figure 16: 1990 Debt/Capital vs Future 22 Year Returns ........................................... Pg 61 
Figure 17: Average Debt/Capital vs P/E ...................................................................... Pg 62 
Figure 18: Average P/E vs ROE .................................................................................. Pg 63 
Figure 19: Friedmand – Savage Utility Function ........................................................ Pg 73 











EXAMINING THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
Modern portfolio theory suggests that an asset’s returns relative to other assets or 
asset classes should be commensurate with the risks an investor assumes when investing 
in that asset relative to the risks of investing in other assets or asset classes.   The Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the most commonly used model in defining an assets 
expected returns relative to an asset’s respective risks.  This simple model initially 
derived to help explain individual stock returns and portfolios of stocks was first 
introduced by Jack Treynor, William Sharpe, John Lintner and Jan Mossin in the early  
                              CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPM) 
Figure 1  
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1960s and was built on the back of Harry Markowitz’s work on modern portfolio 
theory and diversification often called the “mean-variance model” used for predicting a 
portfolio’s future returns. This model is widely used in applications such as estimating 
the cost of capital for firms and evaluating the performance of managed portfolios.   The 
attraction of the Capital Asset Pricing Model is that it offers pleasing and simple 
predictions about how to measure risk and the relationship between expected return and 
idiosyncratic risk. Under CAPM, volatility and risk are measured by a stock’s beta versus 
a stock market benchmark such as the S&P 500 Index.  For example, a stock that moves 
two or three times more in magnitude than the direction of the S&P 500 on a daily basis 
over a certain period of time is considered to hold higher beta and therefore has higher 
volatility than a stock that moves in-line with magnitude of the S&P 500 on a daily basis 
or over the same time horizon.  The Capital Asset Pricing Model looks at an asset’s 
expected return as a function of that asset’s beta relative to the beta of some benchmark 
index plus the risk free rate of return available to investors in the marketplace.  For 
example, a stock with a beta of 1.5x relative to the S&P 500 in an environment where the 
risk free rate of return on US government securities is 5% and the average return on the 
market is 8% would yield an expected return of 9.5% [Equation: Expected Return = Risk 
Free rate + Beta (S&P 500 return – Risk Free Rate of Return or 5% + 1.5 (8%-5%) = 
9.5%].   The basic idea is that a stock with higher volatility relative to the broader stock 
market should compensate investors with higher relative returns versus the stock market 
over a long period of time relative to a stock with lower volatility versus the broader 
market.    As a rational investor, why take higher risk if one isn’t compensated with 
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higher returns? As a result of incurring this higher volatility, an investor should expect 
higher returns over time.    
Before going further, it is important to understand and define what beta actually 
represents.    Beta is calculated using regression analysis over a specified time frame and 
is measured relative to an index.  In most cases, stock price beta is measured relative to 
the S&P 500 which is the most commonly used proxy for the market as a whole.  Stocks 
with a beta greater than 1 have greater volatility than the overall market.  Stocks with a 
beta equal to 1 have similar volatility to the market as a whole and stocks with a beta of 
less than 1 have lower volatility relative to the market.  Statistically, the beta of an 
investment measures how it co-varies with the market portfolio, in the case the S&P 500.   
In other words, beta measures the correlated volatility of an asset relative to the volatility 
of an underlying benchmark or how an asset co-varies relative to its benchmark or a 
chosen benchmark.     Since beta is measured relative to a market index, the risk 
surrounding beta is often called non-diversifiable risk.  Non-Diversifiable risk the risk an 
investor assumes which cannot be mitigated at all, often called market risk.   This is the 
part of an asset’s statistical variance that cannot be removed by the diversification 
provided by a portfolio of many risk assets.  Diversifiable risk, on the other hand, is risk 
that can be mitigated, but not necessarily eliminated, by investing across different 
companies in different sectors across different asset classes and different geographies.  
The point here is to minimize the risk of huge loss from taking the whole risk against one 




Unfortunately, the empirical record of the Capital Asset Pricing Model is poor.  
Recent studies on high and low volatility portfolios suggest just the opposite in that high-
beta high volatility stocks actually underperform low-beta low volatility stocks over the 
long term.   This has been called the Low Volatility Anomaly in that the fact that 
investors can earn higher returns while taking lower risk challenges modern portfolio 
theory and rational expectations assumptions.  In the words of Harin de Silva, investors 
are getting a “Free Lunch” by generating excess returns to the market while taking lower 
risks than portfolio theory suggests.   This is an important observation and a profound 
departure from Efficient Market Theory, also dubbed Random Walk Theory by Burton G 
Malkiel in his popular book “A Random Walk Down Wall Street.”  Random Walk theory 
suggests that the market disseminates all information and salient news on stocks quickly 
and accurately in terms of its impact on a stock’s intrinsic value.  By definition, intrinsic 
value refers to the actual value of a company or an asset based on an underlying 
perception of its true value in terms of both tangible and intangible factors.  This value 
may or may not be the same as the current market value as determined by the market.  
According to Malkiel, a company’s intrinsic value will be fully reflected in its stock price 
with respect to risk and return leaving investors little excess profits over the broad 
market.  Thus, over the long run active investors cannot beat aggregate stock market 
returns given markets are believed to be perfectly efficient (Malkiel 53).  The major 
assumption here is that all investors, who are basically constituents of the market, act 
rationally in terms of how they process information about stocks and that all investors are 
risk averse in terms of looking for the best risk-return tradeoff based on available 
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investment opportunities.   In fact, as Nate Silver reflects in his book, The Signal and the 
Noise,  
“The efficient-market hypothesis is intrinsically somewhat self-defeating.  If all 
investors believed the theory – that they can’t make any money from trading since 
the stock market is unbeatable – there would be no one left to make trades and 
therefore no market at all.” (Silver 156)    
 
In other words, the fact that there are markets and investors that constitute markets 
suggests that profit opportunities exist and that the movements and trends that underlie 
markets are subject to the same rational and irrational decisions made by the collective 
actions of individual investors every day.  Along these lines, the idea that low volatility 
low beta stocks actually outperform high volatility high beta stocks suggests that the 
relationship between risk and reward is not perfectly linear as Modern Portfolio Theory 
would suggest but that investors’ marginal aversion to risk may in fact change as an 
investor assumes more or less risk.   
 
A number of studies have looked at the low volatility anomaly in great depth to 
try to understand whether in fact the anomaly exists and whether this low volatility 
anomaly could be influenced by other factors such as country bias, size effect, value 
versus momentum strategies, etc.   In the 1970s, Black, Jensen and Scholes and Robert A. 
Haugen and A. James Heins found that the relationship between risk and return was 
flatter than those predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  Haugen and Heins 
constructed sample portfolios from stocks selected from those listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange from 1926 to 1971.  Each portfolio consisted of 25 stocks for a total of 
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114 portfolios.  No attempts were made to prescreen the stocks to assure their survival 
over the period observed so that survivorship bias was eliminated.  From the relative 
monthly performance for the 114 portfolios, they calculated geometric mean returns and 
standard deviation of the monthly returns over the entire 46-year period and nine shorter 
periods of five years.   Based on their results, they concluded that in fact no risk premium 
exists for risking taking in the stock market and therefore that the conventional 
hypothesis that risk, systematic or otherwise, generates a special reward was not observed 
in their results.  (Heins, Haugen, James 9)  In other words, as investors assumed higher 
risk their return profile did not improve enough to compensate them for the additional 
risk taken as predicted by CAPM.  The traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model suggests a 




linear straight line starting from the risk free rate of rate with zero-beta running up and to 
the right suggesting that expected stock returns improve as beta increases.   If actual stock 
returns were lower than those expected by CAPM, then this would suggest that either 
investors place a greater than necessary penalty on stocks which exhibit higher volatility 
or that investors tend to overestimate the returns on high beta stocks and/or underestimate 
the returns on low beta stocks which would violate rational expectations, a key 
assumption in the CAPM.   
 
Haugen and Heins went so far as to suggest that CAPM is not just flatter than 
predicted but actually inverted in their shorter 5 year sample periods suggesting that 
investors could actually make positive returns by investing in low risk stocks while 
generating negative returns in high risk stocks such that not only were investors penalized 
for taking greater risk but they were actually rewarded for taking lower risk during that 
sample period.  (Heins, Haugen, James 9)  In 1992, Eugene Fama and Kenneth French 
looked at data from 1941 through 1990 suggesting a similar flat CAPM curve relative to 
expectations. According to Fama and French, regression models used to test CAPM have 
consistently shown that the coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market 
return which in this case is proxied as the average return on a portfolio of US common 
stocks minus the Treasury bill rate.  (French, Fama 53)   
 
The intercepts in time series regressions of excess asset returns and the excess 
market return are positive for assets with low betas and negative for assets with high 
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betas.    In fact, based on Fama and French’s work, the predicted return on the portfolio 
with the lowest beta is 8.3% per year while the actual return is 11.1%.  The predicted 
return on the portfolio with the highest beta is 16.8% per year while the actual return is 
13.7%.  Fama and French concluded that the variation in expected return is unrelated to 
market beta and went so far as to suggest that ratios such as book value to market equity, 
earnings to price ratios and earnings to cash flow ratios actually do a better job of 
explaining stock returns than beta and CAPM.  (French, Fama 53)    More recently, 
Clark, de Silva and Thorley looked at minimum variance portfolios between 1968 and 
2005.  Based on the 1,000 largest US stocks over that period, the authors found that 
minimum variance (i.e. those with the lowest beta relative to the market) portfolios 
achieved a volatility reduction of 25% relative to the broader stock market while 
delivering comparable, or even higher, average returns over that time noting that low 
volatility actually produced commensurate better returns than an equivalent size portfolio 
of high volatility stocks.    In fact, the average monthly returns for the lowest volatility 
portfolio were ~1% between 1968 and 2005 while the average monthly standard 
deviation was ~3.7%.   This, according to the authors, was in stark contrast to the highest 
volatility portfolio which generated monthly average returns of ~0.8% with an average 
monthly standard deviation of ~8.8%.  Furthermore, the 2
nd
 quintile portfolio in terms of 
lowest volatility carried similar monthly returns to the lowest volatility portfolios but 




 quintile portfolios also 
generated similar average monthly returns but with 50% and 85% greater average 
monthly standard deviation respectively.  Therefore, the authors found that there was no 
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return premium for assuming higher risk as predicted by CAPM  (Clark, de Silva Thorley 
43).  In addition, in 2006 Andrew Ang, Robert J. Hodrick, Yuhang Xing and Xiaoyan 
Zhang looked at stocks across 23 developed markets and the difference in average returns 
between extreme quintile portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic volatility.   The study 
controlled for factors including world market, size and value factors and ruled out 
explanations such as trading frictions, information dissemination and higher moments. 
They concluded that stocks with recent past high idiosyncratic volatility tend to have 
much lower returns than stocks with recent past low volatility with respect to local, 
regional and world stock markets.    In their results, there was a statistically significant 
difference between the returns of the highest and lowest quintile portfolios when sorted 
by volatility.  (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, Zhang 23)  In addition, in 2007 David Blitz and Pam 
van Vliet looked at the alpha spread of low versus high volatility portfolios on a global 
basis and concluded that the lowest decile volatility portfolios outperformed the highest 
decile volatility portfolios by 12% between 1986 and 2006.  Similar to Ang, Hodrick, 
Xing and Zhang, this study controlled for geography, size bias and strategy bias (i.e. 
value versus growth or value versus momentum) and concluded that low volatility 
portfolios still outperformed high volatility portfolios in a statistically significant manner.  
Their results showed that the difference in absolute returns between top and bottom 
decile volatility portfolios was 5.9%.   Interestingly, the authors noted that while low 
volatility portfolios underperformed high volatility portfolios in months with positive 
market returns and outperformed high volatility portfolios in months with negative 
market returns, the amount by which low volatility portfolios underperformed in up 
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market months was much less than the amount by which they outperformed in down 
market months.  Furthermore, when controlling for size and value effects, their studies 
suggested that about one third of the alpha spread disappeared but still low volatility 
portfolios outperformed high volatility portfolios by 8.1% and this positive alpha spread 
was consistent across all geographies.  (Blitz, Van Vliet 102-113) 
 
In a separate study conducted in August 2012 by the S&P Dow Jones Indices, 
Aye M. Soe, Director of Index Research & Design suggests that the “low volatility 
effect” challenges traditional equilibrium asset pricing theory (CAPM) that higher risk 
securities should be rewarded with higher expected returns while lower-risk assets 
receive lower returns over a sufficient period of time.  According to Aye’s research, over 
a 10-year period of time end on March 31, 2012, the S&P 500 Low Volatility Index 
returned 6.95% with 10.75% standard deviation while the Minimum Volatility Index 
returned 5.1% with 12.32% standard deviation.  Both of these relatively low volatility 
indexes generated superior returns to the broader S&P 500 Index that returned 4.12% 
with 15.99% standard deviation.  In other words, by investing in a basket of low-risk risk 
stocks as defined by their implied beta to the market, an investor can generate 24% to 
68% higher returns while assuming 23% to 34% lower volatility.  In addition, there was 
no market capitalization bias in Aye’s study.  In looking at large, medium and small size 
companies, over a medium to long term time horizon, the low volatility is indeed present 
across all three attributes although the low volatility effect is strongest and most evident 
across the large capitalization categories and weakest across the smaller market 
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capitalization category.  In addition, Aye’s research suggested asymmetric returns across 
low-volatility strategies in their ability to capture up and downside returns.  Similar to 
Blitz and Vliet, Aye observed that low volatility strategies tend to underperform high 
volatility strategies when markets are trending upwards and outperform high volatility 
strategies when markets are trending downwards.  Importantly, though, low volatility 
strategies underperformed less in upward trending markets than they outperformed in 
downward trending markets.    Low volatility strategies underperformed by 
approximately 0.55% to 1.7% during up market periods depending on market 
capitalization but outperformed by 1.4% and 2.5% during down markets.  On average, 
low-volatility strategies outperformed their respective market benchmarks in 47-50% of 
the months studied but low-volatility strategies outperformed less frequently when the 
market trended upward and outperformed markets approximately 73% to 87% of the 
times when market returns were negative.  This asymmetric response to market 
movement highlights the ability of low-volatility strategies to provide downside 
protection in uncertain times.   Taken together, low volatility strategies possess 
asymmetric risk-return profiles in that they outperform more frequently and with larger 












THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SURROUNDING CAPM AND BETA 
The purpose of this study is to look at the S&P 500 returns over a sufficiently 
long period of time in order to determine whether this low volatility effect has held and 
what other distinctions we can draw between high and low volatility portfolios in 
addition to other aspects of stocks that may influence returns versus simply volatility.   
Specifically, I took the individual constituents of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index over a 
period of 22 years beginning from 1990 and ending in 2012.  The Standard & Poor’s 500 
is an equity index most commonly used as a benchmark proxy for investment managers.  
The Standard and Poor’s index is a free-float capitalization-weighted index based on the 
common stock prices of 500 US companies.  The index consists of both value stocks and 
growth stocks and in general has a bias towards companies with larger market 
capitalizations.  The constituents of the S&P 500 are selected by committee that select 
those companies to be included in the index which deemed most representative of the 
industries in the US economy.   Of the 500 companies in the S&P500, 319 or 60% of the 
members of the index were publicly traded or consistently included in the index over the 
22-year period from 1990 through 2012.  Therefore, the other 181 companies were 
excluded from the sample so that measures of beta and returns were comparable over a 
consistent time frame and through the same market ups and downs.     
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Looking at stock price returns for the constituents of the S&P 500 relative to their 
respective beta over the course of 22 years reveals that there’s little to no positive 
correlation between a stock’s historic beta and that stock’s equity returns over the same 
time frame.    In fact, the average correlation between stock price returns and beta is -0.07 
over the 22 year history for the 319 stocks in this sample.  
Figure 3: Source Bloomberg and Factset 
 
This suggests that higher risk as measured by beta and stock price volatility does not 
generate better returns for investors measured over a sufficiently long period of time that 
is consistent with the academic literature that challenges beta as a predictive indicator of 
future returns.  In fact, according to the empirical data, we start to see diminishing 
improvement in returns as beta rises to the point where not only are investors assuming 
greater risk without being sufficiently compensated but in fact investors are being 
penalized through poorer returns as beta rises.  This is also consistent with Fama and 
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French’s conclusion that the actual CAPM line is flatter than that assumed by Markowitz 
and early proponents of CAPM suggesting a non-linear relationship between higher risk 
and higher returns.   
 
What’s even more interesting from the empirical data is that investors can actually 
generate higher returns with the same level or even a lower level of stock price volatility 
over this same 22-year period of time that is consistent with studies around the low 
volatility effect.  
Figure 4: Source Bloomberg and Factset 
 
In the above chart, the constituents of the S&P have been sorted and ranked by highest to 
lowest stock price returns over 22 years.   These constituents have then been grouped into 
10 separate portfolios of equally weighted proportions consisting of roughly 32 
companies in each portfolio.   These portfolios are plotted from left to right with the 
portfolios on the far left representing the highest returning stocks while those on the far 
15 
 
right represent the lowest returning stocks.  The results of this study are fascinating.  The 
best and worst performing portfolios over the past 22 years also have the lowest and 
highest beta respectively over the same time frame.  In fact, the best performing portfolio 
had an overall beta of 0.97 which is below the average beta of the market at 1.0x.   In 
other words, investors can actually earn outsized returns while investing in stocks with 
lower relative beta.  This supports the thesis that in fact higher risk does not generate 
higher relative returns that is in violation of modern portfolio theory.   One of the more 
interesting observations from this study show that while the lowest beta portfolio clearly  































Portfolios Deciles Ranked by Beta (1 = Lowest)
Portfolio Returns Sorted by Beta 
 
outperformed the S&P 500 and most other portfolios between 1990 and 2012, the best 
performing portfolio actually had the 5th highest beta of all of the portfolios in the 
sample.  In addition, the portfolio with the 8
th
 highest beta of the 10 portfolios had the 3rd 
best returns over 22 years.  This seems to suggest that while low beta investment 
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strategies do generally outperform higher beta investment strategies, extremely high beta 
portfolios actually do relatively well over a long period of time.  This suggests that while 
investors clearly gravitate towards companies with very low beta, they conversely also 
seem to gravitate towards companies with very high beta simultaneously.    This may be 
evidence of what’s known as the longshot favorite and opposite longshot favorite bias in 
motion at the same time.  This phenomenon will be discussed later in this paper.    
 
In 2011, Andrea Frazzi and Lasse H. Pederson conducted one of the more 
interesting studies surrounding the relationship between beta and stock price returns.  
Their study incorporated an investment model that looked at strategies that leverage and 
purchase low beta stocks while simultaneously short selling high beta stocks over a 
period of 83 years between 1927 and 2009 for US equities.  
17 
 
Figure 6: Frazzini and Pederson 
 
In 58 of those 83 years, 70% of the time, their strategy delivered positive returns.  
Frazzini and Pedersen also looked at International Equities over a period of 22 years 
between 1987 and 2009.  In 16 of those 22 years, 72% of the time, their strategy 
delivered positive returns, 2 of those 22 years produced flat returns and 4 of the 22 years 
produced negative returns.  Interestingly their study extended beyond equities into US 
treasury bonds, US credit indices and US corporate bonds.  In each of these cases, their 
strategy of purchasing low beta securities while short selling high beta securities led to an 
outperformance 80% of the time, 81% of the time and 65% of the time respectively.  
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They concluded that stocks with high beta have been found to deliver low risk-adjusted 
returns versus stocks with low beta.   (Pedersen, Frazzini, Lasse 40) This clearly 
challenged the basic premise of the capital asset pricing model in that all agents invest in 
the portfolio with the highest expected return per unit of risk.     
 
The academic research alongside empirical data suggests that beta may not be a 
good measure of risk in gauging stocks and stock returns.   There are some embedded 
problems with beta as a determination of the risk of an investment.   First of all, beta is 
calculated using regression models over a historical time period.  This implicitly means 
beta is backward looking and history may not always be an accurate predictor of the 
future.  In addition, beta doesn’t account for changes that are in the works such as a new 
line of business, divestment of a business or businesses or industry shifts such as 
consolidation or fragmentation.  Finally, beta only measures overall volatility relative to 
the market rather than a specific direction.  For example, in an upward trending market, a 
stock that is outperforming the whole market will have a beta greater than 1.   In this 
case, a stock is considered higher risk but in fact could simply be a function of strong 
overall fundamentals.  Therefore, it may be necessary to find an alternative measure of 











FINDING OTHER MEASUREMENTS FOR STOCK RISK 
From our analysis of beta versus stock price returns, we can conclude that beta 
has little to no relationship to long term stock price returns and therefore assuming higher 
risk by investing in high beta stocks does not lead to above average returns over the long 
term.  In fact, we can argue that beta may not be a good measurement for risk and return 
for stocks at all.  Therefore, in order to understand why portfolios consisting of low 
volatility stocks outperform portfolios consisting of high volatility stocks, we need to find 
and understand where sources of risk and volatility come from.  According to standard 
asset pricing models, the intrinsic value of a stock is equal to the present value of 
rationally expected real cash flows discounted by a fairly constant real discount rate.  
Therefore, the price of stock is a function of two major inputs namely fundamental inputs 
such as revenues, earnings and cash flows and more “psychological” inputs such as 
discount rates which are implicitly expressed through price to earnings ratios, dividend 
yields, price to cash flow ratios and market value to book value ratios that are collectively 
decided by stock market investors.   Fluctuations in fundamental inputs are based on 
expectations of the performance of a particular company that is dependent on factors such 
as a company’s market share, industry growth prospects, trends in profitability, trends in 
the company’s cost structure, etc.  In some cases such as operational expenses, corporate 
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strategy, investment in research & development and capital expenditures on new plant 
and equipment, these factors lie within the control of the management team of that 
corporation to manage and therefore investors place their faith and confidence in the 
ability of a company and its management to show consistent trends in revenues and 
earnings into the future.   Importantly, professional industry analysts employed by wall-
street investment banks and independent research firms that tend to be closely followed 
by individual investors and professional money managers generally establish projections 
and expectations of a company’s earnings prospects.  There is considerable evidence to 
suggest that analyst forecasts and recommendations have a meaningful impact on stock 
prices.  According to Kent Womack, an analysis of new buy and sell recommendations of 
stocks by security analysts at major US brokerage firms shows significant, systematic 
discrepancies between pre-recommendation prices and eventual values.  According to 
Womack’s empirical evidence, for buy recommendations the average price increase after 
the recommendation is made is +2.4% while for sell recommendations, the average stock 
price decline after recommendation is -9.1%.  (Womack 30)    In a separate study 
conducted in 2001 by Brad Barber, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols and Brett 
Trueman using stock prices from 1986 to 1996, concluded that an investor with a 
portfolio of stocks with the most favorable consensus analyst recommendations would 
have generated an average annual abnormal gross return of +4.13% after controlling for 
market risk, corporation size, book-to-market multiples and price momentum effects.  In 
fact, holding a portfolio of least favorable consensus analyst recommendations over that 
same time period would have returned an average of -4.91%.  Stocks tend to 
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underperform after analysts revise down their earnings forecasts or downgrade their 
recommendation on a stock while stock exhibit strong positive abnormal returns after 
analysts revise their forecasts favorably or raise their recommendation on a stock.  
(Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, Trueman 32)  Therefore, investors and professional money 
managers tend to rely heavily on industry analysts’ projections and opinions when they 
value, buy and sell a stock.   
 
Fluctuations in “psychological” factors are much more difficult to predict and in 
many cases tend to rely on factors that are outside of a corporation’s control and outside 
the control of professional industry analysts.   These factors include external macro 
variables such as rates of inflation, risk free rates of return and perceptions of a 
company’s future prospects, the stage of the business cycle, etc all of which can impact 
investor perception and aversion or attraction to risk.  These psychological factors are 
reflected in a company’s price ratios namely dividend yield, price to earnings, price to 
sales, price to book value ratio etc.  For example, if we look at a hypothetical example 
with two companies expected to generate a similar level of earnings per share of $1.00.   
If, for example, company A displays promising future growth prospects, high levels of 
profitability, dominant market share in its industry and has delivered consistent revenue 
growth for a long period of time, Company A may be rewarded with a higher price to 
earnings ratio of perhaps 15.0x.  This implies that company A should trade at a stock 
price of $15 (15 x $1.00 per share).  If, in contrast, company B’s prospects prove to be 
more cyclical and therefore less stable in an industry with low growth prospects, heavy 
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competition and low levels of profitability, investors may only place a price to earnings 
ratio of say 10.0x on Company B’s stock price implying a price of $10 per share.  
Therefore, despite similar levels of earnings, company A’s stock price and future 
earnings will trade at a 33% higher premium to company B simply because investors 
perceive company A’s earnings to be more predictable and therefore more valuable than 
that of company B’s earnings.   Importantly, these multiples are based solely on investor 
perception of value.  This higher valuation in Company A’s stock price is reflective of a 
lower equity risk premium imposed by investors relative to that of Company B’s stock 
price.  In this example, if Company A’s stock price trades at 15.0x its earnings, that 
implies a 7% earnings yield (1/15) versus Company B’s earnings yield of 10%.  
Therefore, investors place a 300 basis point greater discount on Company B’s earnings 
due to their lack of confidence in Company B’s prospects relative to Company A.   
Fluctuations in stock price multiples can have a significant impact on stock prices.  In 
fact, Robert Shiller’s work in 1981 on stock price volatility versus cash flow volatility 
suggests that most of a company’s stock price fluctuation can be explained through 
fluctuations in a company’s discount rate or implied equity risk premium rather than 
volatility in underlying cash flows and dividends.  According to Shiller, measures of 
stock price volatility over the past century appear to be far too high – five to thirteen 
times too high – to be attributed to new information about future real dividends.  In fact, 
the standard deviation of annual changes in real stock prices is over five times higher 
than the observed variability in real dividends.   Shiller goes on to say that these 
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movements in stock prices may be a function of changes in investor uncertainty with 
respect to a company’s dividend distribution or dividend growth path or both (Shiller 24).  
 
Therefore, the two major sources of volatility in stock price movements comes 
from changes in investor’s perception about a company’s future prospects and confidence 
in those prospects as well as fundamental changes in professional analysts’ forecasts 
about a company’s earnings and future earnings prospects.  Importantly, changes in 
investor perceptions and confidence have more influence over a stock price than changes 
in analyst forecasts but both are significant factors in producing stock price volatility.   
Hence, in order to properly understand why low volatility portfolios outperform high 
volatility portfolios, we need to understand what influences investor expectations in 
addition to factors that can influence analysts’ forecasts about a company’s prospects.     
 
One explanation for how analysts and investors can misperceive a company’s 
future prospects lies in the underlying fundamental factors that make up individual 
companies namely leverage and profitability.  In other words, companies with high 
leverage and low levels of profitability will tend to see greater variability in earnings and 
cash flows in weaker economic times relative to companies with low levels of leverage 
and high levels of profitability.  This is because small changes in revenues for companies 
highly levered and operating on thin margins can have much larger impacts on earnings 
and cash flows versus companies with low leverage and high margins.  For example, 
imagine two difference companies, Company A and Company B, in the same industry 
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with the same corporate tax rate and revenue prospects.  Company A has $100 in 
revenues, $50 in fixed expenses and no interest expenses.  Company B has the same $100 
in revenues, $70 in fixed expenses and $10 in interest expenses.  Therefore, Company A 
generates 50% pre-tax margins while Company B generates 20% pre-tax margins.   If 
revenues across the industry fall by 10%, both companies will see their revenues decline 
from $100 to $90.  In the case of Company A, its pre-tax margins will fall from 50% to 
40% or a decline of 20% in terms of total pre-tax profit from $50 to $40.  In the case of 
Company B, its pre-tax margins will fall from 20% to 10% or a decline of 50% in terms 
of total pre-tax profit from $20 to $10.  Thus, Company B will be deemed to have more 
earnings and cash flow volatility relative to a change in revenues versus Company A.   
These differences in fundamental factors were explored in depth in a study conducted by 
Chuck Joyce and Kimball Mayer at GMO LLC.  The two analysts concluded that risk is a 
multifaceted concept and that it is foolish to try to reduce it to a single figure like beta.  In 
fact, according to their work, low risk stocks are characterized by more fundamental 
factors such as low levels of corporate leverage, high levels of profitability, low levels of 
profit volatility and low relative beta.  These types of companies are generally considered 
higher quality due to their respective fundamental attributes.  In looking at both US Large 
Cap companies from 1965 to 2011 in addition to International equities using the standard 
Morgan Stanley EAFE index (EAFE: Europe, Australia, Asia and the Far East) from 
1985 to 2011, Joyce and Mayer found that low risk stock high quality stocks 
overwhelming outperform high-risk low quality stocks in both the US and International 
markets (Mayer, Kimball 7)  
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Figure 7: Source GMO Capital LLC 
 
One of the more interesting pieces of evidence for high quality low beta stocks 
outperforming low quality high beta stocks is in looking at the equity returns generated 
by Berkshire Hathaway run by the legendary equity investor Warren Buffett.  Andrea 
Frazzini, David Kabiller and Lasse H. Pedersen looked at Warren Buffet’s alpha 
generation over a 30-year period in order to understand where his outsized returns came 
from.  In finance, alpha is defined as the abnormal rate of return on a security or portfolio 
in excess of what would be predicted by an equilibrium model like the capital asset 
pricing model.  In other words, the excess returns from an investment relative to the risks 
from that investment.  Frazzini, Kabiller and Pedersen identified several unique features 
consistent with Warren Buffett’s portfolio one of which included buying stocks that are 
safe (low beta and low volatility) and high quality meaning stocks that are profitable, 
stable, growing and with high payout ratios.   Between 1976 and 2011, Berkshire 
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Hathaway’s publicly listed stock portfolio produced excess returns of 9.7% per year 
versus the overall stock market returns of 6.1% per year while assuming an average beta 
of 0.77x versus the market beta of 1.0x.  (Frazzini, Kabiller, Pedersen 40)  In fact, in the 
Berkshire Hathaway 1989 annual report, Warrant Buffett says, “It’s far better to buy a 
wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.”  In Buffett’s 
own words, his strategy as a stock picker has always been to focus on high quality 
companies rather than trying to find bargains with low quality companies.   
 
In looking at similar fundamental factors for companies across the 10 portfolios in 
this study we can find similar conclusions with respect to stock price returns, beta and 
average levels of corporate leverage and return on common shareholders’ equity.   The 
table above looks at the same 10 portfolios that we constructed by looking at the S&P 
500 Index for the past 22 years.  In addition to beta and returns, this analysis includes 22-
year average debt to capital ratios and the average return on common equity across the 
portfolio based on the constituents of each portfolio and the average price to earnings 
ratio across all stocks within each portfolio.   I chose to focus on debt to capital and 
return on equity (ROE) because corporate leverage is an attribute closely watched by 
equity and fixed income investors as a gauge of bankruptcy risk and the ability for a 
corporate to meet its debt obligations while ROE is a broad measure of a corporation’s 
profitability relative to a company’s equity capital.   Using the Dupont ratio, a company’s 
ROE is calculated by multiplying that company’s operating margin by its asset turnover 
by its leverage ratio.  A company’s return on equity is a commonly used benchmark by 
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investors and corporate executive in determining how well a company utilizes its total 
available capital and the profitability of that company’s capital base.  In this case, 
operating margins are defined as a company’s total revenues less total cost of good plus 
overhead operating expenses.  Debt to capital is a commonly used measure by equities 
analysts in analyzing the level of indebtedness a corporation has relative to the total 
assets of the company.  Importantly, for this analysis, only long term debt and obligations 
are included as opposed to short-term debt that is usually used for working capital or 
accounts payables.  Most short-term liabilities are funded by short-term assets and 
therefore do not represent interest expenses or long term claims against a company’s 
assets.   
 
The most interesting observation in this study is the relationship between portfolio 
performance, average debt to capital ratios and average ROE.  The average debt to capital 
for the worst performing portfolio is nearly 9 times higher than the average debt to capital 
for the top-performing portfolio. In fact, the average debt to capital for the top 5 
performing portfolios in the group was 35% vs. 46% for the bottom 5 performing 
portfolios in the group.  In addition, the average ROE for the top five best performing 
portfolios was 22.9% vs. 8.9% for the five worst performing portfolios showing much 
higher returns on equity capital for the top performing portfolios relative to the five worst 
performing portfolios.   In fact, the top performing portfolio generated an average ROE of 
38.6% and returns of 45% over the 22 year period while the portfolio with the lowest 
ROE at 1.1% generated returns of just 14% over the same time period.  Therefore, there 
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does seem to be a strong relationship between long term shareholder returns and 
fundamental factors such as debt/capital and return on equity capital.   In fact, the average 
compound annual growth rate for the best performing portfolio in the group was 382% 
over 22 years versus flat for the worst performing portfolio.  In addition, the average 
compound annual growth rate for the top five best performing portfolios is 117% over a 
22 year period versus just 9.2% for the five worst performing portfolios.   
 
What’s most interesting in looking at earnings per share is the standard deviation 
of earnings relative to their respective growth rates.  While the top five best performing 
portfolios grew at a compound annual growth rate that was five times faster than the five 
worst performing portfolios, the standard deviation of earnings for the top five best 
performing portfolios was half that of the five worst performing portfolios.   In other 
words, not only did the five worst performing portfolios show a lower rate of compound 
earnings growth over the past 20 years but the volatility of those earnings were nearly 
50% greater than the top five best performing portfolios.  Companies with high levels of 
earnings and cash flow volatility tend to be harder to predict by both analysts and 
investors.    
 
In fact in looking at risk adjusted returns across the 319 stocks from our Standard 
& Poor’s 500 Index sample from 1990 to 2012 by ranking returns by beta alone, the 
highest beta portfolio would have generated an average annual return of 22.1% at an 
average beta of 2.25 times.   In other words, the highest beta portfolio generated 
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approximately 10% return for every 1.0 unit of beta assumed.  The second highest beta 
portfolio would have returned an average 30.6% for a beta of  
1.68 or nearly 18% return for every 1.0 unit of beta.  The third highest beta portfolio 
would have returned 81.9% for a beta of 1.46 or 56% return for every 1.0 unit of beta.  In 
fact, the 5
th
 lowest beta portfolio generated a return of 122.7% for a beta of 1.01 or 120% 
return for every unit of beta.  The standout risk adjusted return portfolio is actually the 
lowest beta portfolio with a 22 year compound average annual return of 79.5% for 0.34x 
beta or 232% return for every unit of beta. In other words, in general an investor could 
have assumed lower average beta versus the market with higher returns especially when 
adjusted for the level of risk assumed.   
 
If we then rank our universe of stocks based on fundamental factors such as 
lowest to highest debt to total capital and highest ROEs, we get a strikingly different 
picture.   Under this analysis, the lowest debt to capital portfolio generated a total return 













































Portfolio Deciles Ranked by Debt/Capital (1 = Lowest)
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The second lowest leverage portfolio generated a return of 82.2% (portfolio 2) with a 
total overall leverage ratio of 19.1%.   Interestingly, these two portfolios had an average 
beta of 0.97 and 1.29 respectively which is very basically on par with the average beta of 
the S&P 500 over the same time frame.  In other words, higher returns versus the market 
without assuming much greater risk.   In contrast, the second and third highest levered 
portfolios generated returns of 29.5% (portfolio 9) and 27.2% (portfolio 8) respectively.   
In fact, the top five least levered portfolios generated an average return of 81.9% versus 
45.1% for the top five highest levered portfolios.     
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Figure 9: Source Bloomberg and Factset 
 
In looking at returns on equity as an additional fundamental factor, the top two portfolios 
with the highest average return on equity generated returns of 38.7% and 69.9% 
respectively while those portfolios with the lowest returns on equity generated returns of 
34.7, 42.1% and 13.2% respectively.   Here again we see a positive relationship between 
profitability as measured by ROE and returns although the portfolio with the highest level 
of profitability does not necessarily generate the best returns over the 22-year period, the 
remaining nine portfolios show a strong positive correlation between ROE and returns.  
The point here is that fundamental factors such as leverage and ROE in combination tend 
to be better predictors of future returns vis-à-vis beta.     
 
The analysis above seems to suggest that there’s a direct relationship between 
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lower levels of debt/capital and higher ROEs tend to perform better over time than 
companies with high levels of debt/capital and low ROEs.  Therefore, fundamental 
factors such as leverage and return on equity appear to be better measures of risk and 
therefore better predictors of future stock price returns versus a single variable such as 
beta and standard deviation.  While beta does a good job in assessing day to day stock 
price volatility, in general beta does a poor job in forecasting future stock price returns.  
This makes sense from a business perspective.  ROE and debt/capital measure a 
company’s fundamental characteristics.  In looking at different companies across 
different industries, we tend to find that over the long term, most companies have a 
difficult time generating abnormally high returns on capital far and above their cost of 
capital for a sustainable period of time.  That’s because abnormally high levels of return 
tend to entice competition to enter a market and try to compete for a slice of these high 
returns.  Higher competition means that returns for a company’s product or service is 
likely to erode until returns stabilize to a more normal level generally commensurate with 
that company’s or that industry’s cost of capital.  Returns on capital generally don’t fall 
below the cost of capital because companies would choose to shut their operations if 
returns on capital fell below the cost of capital.  Why stay in business if you’re bound to 
generate economic losses?  Therefore, companies that generate high ROEs over a long 
term time horizon tend to be in industries with very little competition and therefore 
companies have oligopolistic or monopolistic positions or companies have a 
technological advantage or brand equity that is difficult for competition to replicate and 
compete away or a combination of both.  Either way, we see that companies with high 
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ROEs tend to have abnormally unique characteristics and fundamental factors which also 
tend to insulate them through the ups and downs of economic cycles.  In addition, 
debt/capital tends to measure a company’s total leverage which can be a good attribute in 
goods economic times and a highly negative attribute during bad economic times.   
Excess leverage can have a number of deleterious impacts on a company.  Excess 
leverage can restrict a company’s ability to invest and expand in growth projects if debt 
payments consume a large portion of a company’s cash flow.  This can lead to reduced 
market share and limit a company’s ability to successfully compete against its peers.  
Similarly, high levels of leverage can psychologically impair a management’s willingness 
to take risks in developing new products or going after new markets.  With an excessively 
conservative management team companies can become inflexible and lose 
competitiveness over time.  Finally, excess leverage can amplify cash flow volatility 
especially during a bad business cycle or economic cycle.  In addition, if a company’s 
cash flows and balance sheet come under question, creditors may demand a higher rate of 
interest.  Therefore, high leverage and high debt payments can actually create a vicious 
cycle of deteriorating cash flow volatility led by high debt creating more cash flow 












THE ROLE OF ANALYSTS FORECASTS IN STOCK PRICE VOLATILITY 
Stock market valuation only explains part of the low volatility anomaly.  As 
discussed earlier, stock prices are a function of both multiples placed on earnings by 
investors as well as projected fundamental prospects such as revenues, earnings and cash 
flows set by professional industry analysts.  Academic research has proven that 
individual traders and professional money managers with respect to how a company’s 
stock price is perceived by the broader market closely follow professional analysts’ 
projections, opinions and recommendations about stocks.   In order to understand the low 
volatility anomaly, we need to understand the role that a company’s fundamentals 
including revenues, earnings and cash flow plays in impacting analyst’s projections about 
its future prospects.   More specifically, we need to understand how accurate analysts are 
in projecting earnings and cash flows for publicly traded companies, what impacts and 
influences these projections and most importantly how earnings predictability impacts 
stock market valuations.  Ilia D. Dichev and Vicki Wei Tang conducted one of the more 
interesting studies on this subject.  Dichev and Tang looked at a sample of 22,113 
publicly traded companies and their earnings and operating cash flows between 1984 and 
2004.  The study looked at cash flow volatility over the 20 year time period.  Companies 
were then separated into quintiles based on their level of cash flow volatility.  Those with 
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the highest volatility were placed into the highest quintile while those with the lowest 
volatility were placed into the lowest quintile.   In addition, Dichev and Tang looked at 
Wall Street analyst’s earnings and cash flow forecasts on both short term and long term 
time horizons.  The two authors make a number of important conclusions.  First, short 
term specifications indicate that low-volatility earnings have much higher persistence as 
compared to high-volatility earnings.  Beyond short-term specifications, long-run tests 
indicated that earnings volatility has substantial predictive power for up to 5 years in the 
future.  Earnings with low volatility have remarkably high persistence and correlation 
during the entire predictive horizon, while earnings with high volatility show quick 
reversion to the mean and little reliable predictability (Dichev, Tang, Wei 21).   This 
means that companies that have low earnings and cash flow volatility in the short term 
tend to show a persistently low level of future earnings volatility.  This future level of 
earnings persistence is even stronger when companies show low volatility over a longer-
term time horizon.   Thus, if a company shows low cash flow volatility over a 1-year and 
5-year time horizon, there’s a strong likelihood that the same company will show low 
cash flow volatility and therefore higher cash flow predictability into the future.  On the 
other hand, companies with high cash flow volatility are more likely to see their earnings 
and cash flows mean revert to an average level over the long term and therefore show 





The second important conclusion from Dichev and Tang’s study was that 
companies with higher earnings volatility also tend to have larger errors in analyst’s 
forecasts over a given period of time than those of companies with low earnings 
volatility.   These errors tend to be larger and more frequent the longer the time horizon 
of the study.  Based on empirical results, their study found that it is easier to predict 
earnings 5 years ahead for low-volatility firms than to predict earnings 1 year ahead for 
high volatility or even all firms.  This suggests earnings volatility has a remarkable 
differentiating power in the long-run prediction of earnings. In fact, based on their 
research, the two authors found that on average analysts do not fully understand the 
implications of earnings volatility for future earnings and in quantitative terms analysts 
impound less than half of the full implications of earning volatility for earnings 
predictability.    Additional tests revealed that the results are nearly the same for 2-year-
ahead earnings forecasts (Dichev, Tang, Wei 21).     
 
In looking at our sample of 319 stocks from the S&P 500 between 1990 and 2012, 
it’s very clear that companies with the fewest negative earnings surprises over the course 
of the past 22 years outperformed those companies with the most negative earnings 
surprises.  For this study, a positive or negative earnings surprise is defined as differences 
between analysts’ estimates for a company’s earnings on January 1
st
 of each calendar 
year and the actual company’s earnings report on December 31
st
 of that same calendar 
year.  Clearly and unsurprisingly, we can see from figure 11 that companies that tend to 
exceed analyst’s forecasts tend to perform better than companies that disappoint analyst 
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estimates.   Figure 11 looks at a company’s actual earnings in a given year relative to 
analyst forecasts at the beginning of that year and the number of years between 1990 and 
2012 when a company positively or negatively surprised analyst forecasts.  In fact, the 
highest returning portfolio between 1990 and 2012, on average, exceeded analyst 
consensus forecasts 69% of the time while the worst performing portfolio negatively 
surprised analyst consensus expectations 57% of the time over the same 22 year period.   
Figure 10: Source Factset 
 
Additionally, Figure 12 further supports the idea that companies with higher quality 
fundamentals tend to have more stable earnings predictability and tend to generate better 
returns for investors over the long run.  Figure 12 shows us the relationship between 
companies that most frequently report negative year-over-year earnings declines and their 
respect leverage ratios (defined here as debt-to-capital) and operating margins. I’ve used 
operating margins in place of ROE in this case as operating margins are a more direct 
measure of year-to-year change in business conditions while ROE has multiple factors 
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namely leverage, asset turnover, operating margins and tax rates.   Again, we can see that 
in general, companies with lower leverage and higher operating margins tend to have 
fewer years with earnings declines and generally outperform over the long run.   In fact, 
the portfolio with the lowest debt to capital also had the fewest years with negative year-
over-year earnings declines.  This is most likely due to the fact that companies with high 
leverage and low profitability have much higher levels of operational and financial 
gearing through up and down economic cycles.  In extending this study beyond just 
positive and negative earnings surprises, we ranked the 10 portfolios based on companies 
that reported the smallest deviation between estimated earnings forecasts and actual 
earnings reports regardless of the whether the actual report was better or worse than 
projected.   In Figure 12, we can see, interestingly, that those companies that had the 
smallest deviation between estimated earnings and actual reported earnings generally had 
much lower beta than companies with large deviations from estimated versus actual 
earnings.  In addition, companies with the lowest deviation from estimates also generally 
had much higher operating margins.   This supports the idea that stocks with high 
volatility generally have less earnings predictability and that earnings predictability is 
partially of a function of fundamental factors such as profitability.  This may be due to 
the fact that companies with higher average levels of profitability and therefore generate 
higher average returns on capital are generally companies with high and sustainable 
market share in industries with stable and predictable end market demand.  These types 
of companies will have more stable earnings over the course of different economic 
cycles.   Overall, Figures 11 and 12 show us that analysts have a harder time predicting 
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future earnings for companies with high levels of leverage and low levels of operating 
margins and that consequently these same companies tend to show higher levels of 
volatility over a long term time horizon due to this lack of earnings predictability, higher 
frequency of earnings declines and generally higher perceived level of uncertainty and 
risk.   
 

























BEHAVIORAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LOW VOLATILITY ANOMALY 
There are a number of theories using behavioral economics as a basic framework 
to attempt to explain this low volatility anomaly in stock market returns as it relates to 
investor behavior.  Malcolm Baker, Brendan Bradley and Jeffrey Wurgler suggested that 
such behavior is reflective of investor preferences for lotteries, representativeness and 
overconfidence as three reasons based on behavioral economics to explain the low risk 
anomaly (Baker, Bradley, Wurgler 26).  Many of these findings are grounded in research 
first published by Nobel Prize winning psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky in the late 1970s and more recent work conducted by Richard Thaler of the 
University of Chicago.  Preference for lotteries suggests that when presented with an 
opportunity to win a large expected payoff combined with the prospects of a limited but 
negative expected payout investors will choose to take the gamble.  In other words, if 
given a 50% chance of losing $100 versus a 50% chance of winning $110, most people 
will choose not to gamble despite a positive expected payoff of $5 given the potential 
large loss of $100.  This is because of two concepts called Loss Aversion and Prospect 
Theory, first defined by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979.   According to Kahneman and 
Tversky, loss aversion suggests that investors would shy away from volatility for fear of 
realizing a loss.  A gambler’s risk aversion can be defined to depend on the minimum 
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probability of success that would him to accept a bet.  The higher the minimum 
probability he demands, the higher his risk aversion.  Despite the idea that a rational 
person would take the bet given the positive expected payoff, the magnitude of negative 
utility from realizing a loss or the possibility of realizing a loss is much greater than the 
same magnitude of positive utility from realizing a gain or the possibility of realizing a 
gain.  The notion that people derive greater negative utility from a loss relative to the 
positive utility they would gain from a commensurate amount of profit is central to 
Daniel Kahnemann’s Nobel Prizing winning work around Prospect Theory.  As 
Kahnemann explains, for some reason outside of the bounds of rational decision-making, 
individuals place a greater “penalty” on the possibility of realizing negative utility versus 
the same value of positive utility.   But suppose that same individual is given a 0.12% 
chance of winning $5,000 or a 99.88% chance of losing a mere $1.  Again, this gamble 
presents an individual with the possibility of a large and positive expected payoff but 
with the possibility of a small but negative expected payout but in this case most people 
will choose the gamble despite the near certainty of realizing a loss.  According to 
Kahneman and Tversky’s notion of Prospect Theory, this is because the magnitude of 
potential negative utility is small enough that the gambler can “take the pain” of a 
potential loss for the prospect of a large positive payoff (Kahneman, Tversky, Daniel 9).   
This explains the amount of money spent on roulette wheels and lotteries despite having 
negative expected payoffs.  Carrying this illustration over to the stock market, with 
individually low priced highly volatile stocks, investors perceive that they have limited 
liability with a small chance of doubling or tripling in value in a short period of time and 
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therefore choose to take the risk.  In short, these high volatility stocks represent lottery 
tickets in the mind of investors.    
 
Another explanation cited as an explanation for the low volatility anomaly 
suggests representativeness.  According to Kahneman and Tversky, representativeness 
takes place when people use preconceived biases and judgments to attach probabilities to 
an outcome without respect to prior probabilities.  If people evaluate probability by 
representativeness, prior probabilities often get neglected and can lead to erroneous and 
serious errors based on judgments of probability rather than mathematical facts.  One 
classic case study conducted by Kahneman and Tversky took place when subjects were 
shown brief personality descriptions of several individuals, allegedly sampled at random 
from a group of 100 professionals namely engineers and lawyers.   In one experimental 
condition, subjects were told that the group from which the description was drawn 
consisted of 70 lawyers and 30 engineers and in another experiment subjects were told 
that the group consisted of 30 lawyers and 70 engineers.  After being given a description 
of the individual without disclosing that person’s occupation, subjects were asked to 
assess the probability that the individual was an engineer or a lawyer.  Despite the odds 
of a lawyer vs. engineer standing at 70:30 in the first experiment and 30:70 in the second 
experiment, the subjects produced essentially the same probability judgments evaluating 
the likelihood that a particular description belonged to an engineer rather than to a lawyer 
by the degree to which this description was representative of the two stereotypes with 
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little to no regard for prior probabilities given for the categories (Kahneman, Tversky, 
Daniel 7).   
 
As it relates to stocks, investors tend to look at high flying stocks like Apple, 
Microsoft and Intel over the years and conclude that speculative high risk stocks are the 
best way to make large amounts of money in the stock market while ignoring the low 
probability with which such companies or stocks actually exhibit outsized returns over 
the long run.   In addition, according to Kahneman and Tversky, people will often exhibit 
insensitivity to sample sizes when establishing judgment probabilities (Kahneman, 
Tversky, Daniel 27).  In other words, investors look at successful stocks like Microsoft, 
Amazon and Apple and assume these companies are more often the rule rather than the 
exception to the rule.   In the example of Microsoft, Amazon and Apple, despite looking 
at a sample size of just three, investors will tend to conclude that most technology 
companies are successful stocks.   
 
Finally, the authors Baker, Bradley and Wurgler looked at investors’ 
overconfidence as another explanation for the low volatility phenomenon.   
Overconfidence suggests that investors place more confidence and therefore a higher 
probability on an outcome with their own judgments than actual outcomes (Baker, 
Bradley, Wurgler 12).   According to Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky, people’s 
confidence is determined by the balance of arguments for and against the competing 
hypothesis, with insufficient regard for the weight of the evidence (Tversky, Griffin 24).  
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In other words, people are often more confident in their judgments than is warranted by 
the facts.  Overconfidence is not limited to lay judgment or laboratory experiments.  Dun 
& Bradstreet’s well-publicized observation that more than two-thirds of small businesses 
fail within 4 years suggest that many entrepreneurs overestimate their probability of 
success.   
 
One of the more interesting examples of overconfidence involves what’s often 
called the Favorite Long Shot Bias.   R. M. Griffith first observed the Favorite Long Shot 
bias in 1949.   Griffith looked 519 horse races in 1947 at the spring meets of Churchill 
Downs, Belmont and Hialeah.   Griffith used horse track races because in horse race 
betting, the odds on the various horses in any race are a function of the proportion of the 
total money that is bet on each and does therefore the house set socially determined rather 
than pre-established odds.  On the other hand, the objective probability for winners from 
any group of horses is given a posteriori by the percentage of winners.  Therefore, the 
odds express (reciprocally) a psychological probability of outcomes while the percentage 
winners at any odds group measures the true probability of outcomes.   Griffith wanted to 
understand whether there were consistent and significant discrepancies between the 
psychological probabilities and the actual outcomes.   From his findings, Griffith 
concluded that while most of the betting pool for horse races are placed on the short odds 
(the higher probability winning horse), the amount is not great enough relative to what 
the actual outcomes suggest.  In other words, bettors consistently wagered too much on 
horses with long odds of winning and too little on horses with highly certain odds of 
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winning.  This suggests that investors tend to overvalue long shot bets while 
undervaluing sure shot favorites.  In other words, when looking at two different bets, one 
with large but highly unlikely payoffs or the long shot and one with smaller but more 
highly probable payoffs or the sure shot, investors will tend to bet more often on the long 
shot than the odds would suggest.  More specifically, the expected returns per dollar bet 
increase monotonically with the probability of the horse winning.  Favorites win more 
often than the subjective probabilities imply and long shots less often.  This means that 
favorites are much better bets than long shots (Griffith 4).   In 1986, Ziemba and Hausch 
published studies based on over 50,000 horse track races in the State of California.  In the 
figure below, Ziemba and Hausch illustrates the favorite long shot bias using a simply 
diagram.  Expected returns per dollar bet are plotted for horses at various market odds, 
using a transaction cost assumption of t=15.33%, which applies to the State of California.  
The horizontal line indicates the point at which the returns are the expected 0.8467 (1-t).  
This occurs at odds of about 9-2 (i.e. about a 15% probability of winning).  For odds 
above 18-1, there is a steep drop in the expected return, with returns falling to only 13.7% 
per dollar wagered at 100-1.  This means that someone were to bet on a horse with 100-1 
odds, rather than winning one race in 100, that person would win only win one race in 
730.  For odds below 3-10, expected returns are positive with about 4-5% for the 
shortest-odds horses.  In fact, extreme favorites, those with odds of less than 3-10 (greater 
than 70% chance of winning) actually have positive expected values (Ziemba, Hausch 4).  
In one of the more interesting studies on this topic, Erik Snowberg and Justin Wolfers 
(2010) looked at 6.4 million horse race starts in the United States from 1992 to 2001.   
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After looking at the frequency of bets placed on horses with different odds, the authors 
noted a substantial favorite long shot bias.  According to the authors, “using large-scale 
dataset we find evidence in favor of the view that misperceptions of probability drive the 
favorite long shot bias…” Based on their studies, the rate of return to betting on horses at 
long odds is much lower than the return to betting on favorites.  Interestingly, their work 
adjusts for risk loving utility functions versus risk neutral or risk-neutral functions in 
keeping with their conclusions.  They accomplish this by looking not only at the total 
amount that is placed on sure shot and long shot horses relative to their expected returns 
but also by segregating risk-loving bettors versus risk-neutral behavior where risk-
neutrality is defined as gamblers placing bets based on odds that are misperceived 
relative to the actual odds offered by the horse-track.  By looking at gamblers that not 
only over-bet long shots but also the size of their relative bets versus risk-neutral players, 
they can separate risk loving versus risk neutral gamblers and therefore test the model 
under both conditions.   The utility functions for risk loving and risk neutral gamblers are 
then estimated from the pricing of winning bets and test for long-shot and sure-shot 
behavior.  In their analysis, the bias for long shots versus favorite bets exists regardless of 
whether a gambler is risk loving or risk neutral.  In addition, their results suggest that the 
low rates of return to betting on long-shots are rationalized by bettors who bet as though 
the tiny probabilities of winning actually have moderate probabilities of winning because 
of misperceptions of risk rather than an affinity towards taking risk.   Similar to Ziemba 
and Hausch, the authors illustrate that the rate of return on win bets declines as risk 




winning races and that this overestimation of returns actually rises as the odds decline.  
Figure 13 shows this in graph format.   Horses are grouped according to their odds and 
the rate of return to betting on every horse in each group is then calculated.  The data is 
graphed on a log-odds  scale in order to better show the relevant range of the data, hence 
the reason for the bulge in the graph at 10/1 odds.  The average rate of return for betting 
favorites is -5.5% while for horses at the mid-range of 3/1 to 15/1 odds yield a rate of 
return of -18% while real long shots, horses at 100/1 odds or more, yield much lower 
returns of -61%.  The expected return from rational betting behavior is shown as the dark 
Figure13: Source Ziemba and Hausch 
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black line.  Snowberg and Wolfers explain that if bettors were perfectly rational, then the 
odds of a horse winning a race would more closely approximate the expected payoffs of 
placing a bet.   Instead, Snowberg and Wolfers found that in fact when looking at actual 
betting returns that bettors lose more money on long-shot horses than one would expect 
and generate fewer losses than one would expect on sure shot horses.  What’s important 
about horse track racing is that it incorporates pari-mutuel betting.  Pari-mutuel bets are 
betting systems in which all bets of a particular type are placed together in a pool and 
payoff odds are calculated by sharing the pool among all winning bets.  In other words, 
the gamblers set the odds based on how heavily they bet on certain horses as opposed to 
the “house” or the race track in this example.  As an example, if $100 of bets are placed 
on 3 different horses of which $50 are placed on horse 1, $30 on horse 2 and $20 on 
horse 3, the payoff on horse 1 would be 1:1 or $1 in returns for every $1 bet.  The payoff 
odds on horse 2 would be roughly 3:1 or $3 in returns for every $1 bet and the payoff on 
horse 3 would be 5:1 or $5 in returns for every $1 bet.   When looking at race day results 
for both standard bets and complex bets such as trifecta betting, Snowberg and Wolfers 
found that bettors place greater odds on long shot bets than what actually transpires on 
race day and similarly bettors place lower odds on sure shot bets relative to what actually 
transpires.  In fact, because overall bets are pooled, over-betting certain odds implicitly 
means under-betting elsewhere with the payoff odds.  In this case, under-betting takes 
place amongst the higher odd horses.  By placing heavier bets on long shots relative to 
the expected payoff on the long shot horse, investors are “over-paying” for the long-shot 
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bet.  In fact, neglecting for transaction taxes, sure shot investments would generate a 
slightly positive payoff (Snowberg, Wolfers, 723-746).  
 
Richard Thaler suggests a number of factors could help explain this anomaly.   
First, both of these studies suggest that bettors tend to overestimate the chances that the 
long shot bets will win and as a result also underestimate the chances that favorite “sure 
shot” bets will win.   The fact that positive expected returns can be made by betting on 
horses with higher odds and lower payoffs suggests this to be the case.  In addition, 
bettors might overweight the small probability of winning in calculating the utility of the 
bet.  In other words, bettors become so enthralled with the prospects of winning large 
payoffs that they overestimate the probability that these payoffs will happen.  In addition, 
bettors may derive utility simply from holding a ticket on a long shot.  Given the fact that 
placing a wage is represents a small out of pocket expense, the prospects of a large payoff 
outweigh the potential small losses that a bettor is likely to incur.  Finally, bettors may 
choose a bet for very irrational reasons such as a horse’s name.  Such bettors can actually 
drive the odds down on the worst horses, with the “smart money” simply taking the better 
bets on the favorites (Thaler 74).   
 
Russell S Sobel and Matt E. Ryan offer up two interesting explanations for the 
existence of the long shot bias namely risk-preference theories and information-
perception theories.  The first group of theories attributes the long shot bias to a 
preference for risk among gamblers.  According to Sobel and Ryan, consumers have a 
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globally risk-averse utility function yet over the relevant range concerning gambling and 
betting, the utility function becomes locally risk loving (Sobel, Ryan 371-385).  Starting 
with conclusion that bettors are risk loving, Quandt in 1986 shows that because of the 
additional utility derived from taking high-risk high variance bets, the payoff of such a 
bet must necessarily be smaller for the high-risk long shot bet than the low-risk favorite 
bet.   In other words, because gamblers and bettors enjoy taking risk and derive more 
utility as they take more risk, the payoffs from taking a high-risk bet should be lower than 
if gamblers were equally risk averse as the general population because of the additional 
unit(s) of utility a gambler receives from taking risk.  The second group of theories, the 
information-perception theories, places the activities of the bettor as a reaction to new 
information at the time of betting as opposed to being naturally predisposed to taking 
riskier bets (Quandt 7).   According to Snowberg and Wolfers (2004), studies by 
cognitive psychologists suggest that bettors do not perfectly absorb information and that 
people are systematically poor at discerning between small and tiny probabilities hence 
they price each similarly.  Furthermore, certain events are strongly preferred to extremely 
likely events, leading to even very likely events to be under-priced.  Ultimately, it is the 
representative bettor’s inability to process information correctly that leads to a favorite-
long shot bias in the information-perception theories (Snowberg, Wolfers 723-746).   
Daniel Kahneman, in his book “Thinking, Fast and Slow” explains that all people have 
two systems for making a decision.  System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with 
little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control while System 2 allocates attention to 
the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations.  The 
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operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, 
choice and concentration.  For example, when a person buys a lottery ticket, the thrilling 
possibility of winning the big prizes is shared by the community and reinforced by 
conversations at work and at home.  Buying a ticket is immediately rewarded by pleasant 
fantasies in which possibility takes over from actual probability.  In this example, System 
1 takes over System 2 in terms of framing the decision of whether or not to buy the 
lottery ticket.  In Kahneman’s recent research, emotion and vividness influence fluency, 
availability and judgments of probability accounting for our excessive response to the 
few rare events that we do not ignore (Kahneman 231).  Benoit B Mandelbrot writes 
extensively about this in his book “The (Mis) Behavior of Markets.  Mandelbrot points 
out that contrary to orthodoxy, stock price changes are very far from following the 
standard Gaussian bell curve.  If they did, one should be able to run any market’s price 
records through a computer and analyze the changes and watch them fall in the 
approximate “normality” assumed by Louis Bachelier’s random walk.  They should 
cluster about the mean, or average, of no change.  In fact, the bell curve fits reality very 
poorly.  According to Mandelbrot, from 1916 to 2003, the daily index movements of the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average do not spread out on graph paper like a simple bell curve.  
The far edges flare out too high: too many big changes.  Theory suggests that over that 
time, there should be fifty-eight days when the Dow moved more than 3.4%; in fact, there 
were 1,001.  Theory predicts six days of index swings beyond 4.5%; in fact there were 
366.  And index swings of more than 7% should come once every 300,000 years; in fact, 
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the twentieth century saw 48 such days.  Therefore, according to Mandelbrot’s research, 
investors tend to underestimate the risks in owning stocks (Mandelbrot 123).   
 
In contrast to the Favorite Long shot Bias, many studies suggest a bias in the other 
direction often referred to as the Opposite Long shot Bias.  Linda and Bill Woodland 
conducted one of the more famous studies involving the Opposite Long shot Bias in 1994 
using professional baseball statistics as their data set.  The analysis included 24,603 
major league baseball games for between the 1979 and 1989 seasons.  Woodland and 
Woodland looked at the actual percentage of times the underdog team won their baseball 
games relative to the odds placed on that team’s chances of winning prior to the game.  
According to the Woodland team, using regression analysis and z-test scores, their 
research indicated that in contrast to racetrack betting, baseball bettors over bet the 
favorites rather than the underdogs.  This reverse bias is even more pronounced when 
heavy underdogs are excluded from consideration.   According to their conclusion, this 
long-standing preference of bettors to over bet favorite teams may represent true market 
inefficiency because people think that betting on the favorites shows and being perceived 
as more knowledgeable is more important than beating the odds (Woodland, Woodland 
10).  In their book “Scorecasting: The Hidden Influences Behind How Sports are Played 
and Games are Won,” Tobias Moskowitz and Jon Wertheim interviewed Dallas Cowboys 
executive Mike McCoy who was brought on by team owner Jerry Jones in 1991 to help 
develop a strategy for drafting a winning team.  McCoy noticed that the value of football 
player draft picks varied dramatically relative to how high or low that player was picked 
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in the overall draft.  A first pick in round one of the NFL draft was paid an amount 
equivalent to the combined value of the sixth pick and the eighth pick and more than that 
of the final four picks of the first round combined (Moskowitz, Wertheim 175-192).  In 
fact two prominent behavioral economists, Richard Thaler of the University of Chicago 
and Cade Massey at Yale, noted that historically the number one pick in the draft is 
typically paid about 80% more than the eleventh pick in draft on the initial contract.   
Thaler and Massey found that the inflated values teams were assigning to high picks were 
remarkably consistent.  The two economists then looked at whether these values were 
justified after examining post draft player performance and results.  They found that 
higher picks are generally better than lower picks on average and the first round draft 
picks on average post better numbers than do second round draft picks who in turn post 
better stats than third round draft picks but that the stats also showed that top round draft 
picks’ performance weren’t that much better than second or third round draft picks 
relative to the salary differentials they were paid.  Thaler and Massey concluded that the 
probability that the first player drafted at a given position is better than the second player 
drafted at the same position is only 53%, slightly better than a tie.  The probability that 
the first player drafted at a position is better than the third player drafted at the same 
position is only 55%.  The probability than the first player drafted at a position is better 
than the fourth player drafted is only 56%.  In other words, by selecting the consensus top 
player at a specific position versus the consensus fourth best player at that position 
increases performance, measured by the number of starts, by only 6%.  Yet teams will 
end up paying, in terms of both players and dollars, as much as four or five times more to 
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get that first player relative to the fourth player.    In fact as a professional football team, 
the smart strategy may be to trade your 1
st
































COEXISTENCE OF THE FAVORITE & OPPOSITE FAVORITE LONGSHOT BIAS  
 
Based on the academic research and the empirical data collected between 1990 
and 2011, there seems to be evidence to indicate that the stock market displays similar 
characteristics to prospect theory and the notion of loss aversion and that as a result, there 
exists both a favorite long shot bias and an opposite favorite long shot bias in stock 
markets.    As discussed earlier, prospect theory suggests that investors perceive a higher 
level of negative utility from a given loss versus the positive utility from an equivalent 
level of gain as show by the equation [+U] < [U-].  For our study, we’ll assume that U is 
equivalent to a unit of earnings power from a company.  As a result, investors will place a 
greater value on avoiding U- by assigning a higher value to U+.  This is natural as 
companies perceived to have safer and more predictable earnings power get rewarded 
through higher long term equity returns rather than companies perceived to have less 
predictable “less safe” earnings power.   This is based on the assumption that most 







How can we tie this idea of predictable earnings power back to the low volatility 
anomaly?   Behavioral studies suggest that investors are overconfident in their ability to 
judge an outcome.  Just as subjects in an experimental setting use representativeness and 
ignore given probabilities when asked about whether a description fits a lawyer or a 
doctor, investors will overestimate their confidence in the future prospects for a company 
when those expectations are based on their own research, whether they use a company’s 
products and services or whether that stock is held in their own portfolios.   If an 
investor’s family uses Apple Computer products at home, that investor may place greater 
confidence in Apple’s future prospects based on a very small sample size.   In addition, 
empirical studies suggest that earnings volatility can have a significant impact on stock 
market valuation that is ultimately a reflection of investor confidence.  
 
This overconfidence gets reflected in higher stock price multiples for companies 
with lower volatility and higher earnings predictability.  In 2005, Graham et all surveyed 
401 financial executives to determine the key factors that drive decisions related to 
reported earnings and found a pronounced aversion to earnings volatility.  In fact, 97% of 
respondents express a preference for smooth earnings.  In exploring the reasons for this 
finding, 80% of the respondents stated that their aversion to volatility was due to their 
belief that higher earnings volatility reduced future earnings predictability (Graham 3-
73).  According to a separate study conducted by Ronnie Barnes in 2001 after adjusting 
for firm size, balance sheet leverage, current levels of profitability and the level of current 
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investment and sales growth, there is a significantly negative relationship between the 
market to book ratio and earnings volatility (defined as the coefficient of variation of 
various earnings measures).   This is consistent with the idea that less variance in 
earnings should be desirable if one wants or needs more of a sure thing.  In addition, 





percentiles of earnings volatility and their respect market to book value ratios.  On 
average, Barnes found that there is a 0.04 difference in market to book value ratios 
between a firm whose earnings volatility is in the 5
th
 percentile and one in the 95
th
 
percentile while there is a 0.23 different in market to book value ratios (approximately 




 percentiles (Barnes 1-47).    
 
This suggests that part of the low volatility anomaly can be explained by investors’ 
aversion to earnings volatility, similar to Kahneman and Tversky’s work around Prospect 
Theory.  Investors perceive earnings volatility similarly to how they perceive the 
potential of realizing a loss on a gamble.   Given that investors realize greater negative 
utility from a given loss relative to the positive utility they realize from a given profit of a 
similar magnitude, investors will place a premium on stocks with lower chances of losing 
money relative to stocks with a higher chance of losing money.   As a result, stocks with 
lower earnings volatility can command a higher valuation by the stock market and 
therefore outperform stocks with a similar level of earnings but with higher earnings 
volatility.  This may actually support the idea that the favorite long-shot bias and the 
opposite favorite long shot bias existing and occurring at the same time.  Importantly, this 
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study also provides evidence supporting the notion of the favorite and opposite favorite 
long shot bias in stock market.  The empirical data used in this study showed that over the 
past 22 years portfolios consisting of those companies with high quality fundamentals 
measured by balance sheet leverage, returns on capital and consistent earnings 
performance relative to analyst expectations generally outperformed portfolios consisting 
of companies with lower quality fundamentals within the ten portfolios actually showed 
some of the weakest performance in terms of stock price performance over the past 22 
years.   Interestingly, the two portfolios with the best and worst fundamentals 
respectively measured by leverage and ROE actually showed relative poor performance 
versus the 10 portfolios in aggregate.  Figure 15 looks at return on equity in 1990 for the 
325 companies that make-up the 10 portfolios in our sample and their respective returns 
between 1990 and 2012.   The portfolio consisting of those companies with the highest 
ROEs and the portfolio consisting of those companies with the lowest ROEs ratios 
generated 45.0% and 16.4% respectively while the 10 portfolios in aggregate generated 
returns of 48.2% over the same time period.    
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Figure 15: Source Factset 
 
 
Figure 16 looks at debt/capital ratios for those same companies across the 10 portfolios in 
our sample.  The portfolio consisting of consisting of those companies with the lowest 
and highest debt/capital ratios generated 38.7% and 13.2% returns respectively over the 
22 years between 1990 and 2012, again below the average 48.2% for all ten portfolios 
during the same time frame.   
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Figure 16: Source Factset 
 
The point here is that had an investor simply invested his or her money in those stocks 
with the best fundamentals or the worst fundamentals in an attempt to generate outsized 
returns, that investor would have underperformed the broader stock market.  In order to 
understand why, we need to look at the relative value placed upon companies with the 
best and worst fundamentals across long term time horizons.  Figures 17 and 18 look at 
the average price-to-earnings ratios (P/E) for our sample portfolios sorted by lowest to 
highest debt/capital ratios and highest to lowest returns on equity.  As discussed earlier, 
P/E ratios are essentially qualitative values determined by market participants and placed 
on stocks to determine a companies’ stock price.  Recall, a stock’s price is equivalent to a 
companies’ earnings per share (EPS) multiplied by its P/E ratio.  The figures below 
suggest that companies with the lowest debt/capital ratio and the highest debt/capital ratio 
trade at relatively high P/E ratios versus the 10 portfolios in aggregate.  The portfolio 
consisting of those companies with the lowest debt/capital ratio traded at an average P/E 
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of 22x between 1990 and 2012 versus the average P/E ratio of 20x over the same time 
frame for all 10 portfolios, a premium of 10% over the group average.  Similarly, the 
portfolio consisting of those companies with the highest debt/capital ratio traded at an 
average P/E of 21.3x over the same time frame, a premium of 7% over the group average.   
In other words, investors pay a high premium for companies with the best and worst 
debt/capital ratios.  In addition, figure 20 shows a similar analysis except looking at ROE 
instead of debt/capital.  Again, the portfolios of companies with the highest and lowest 
ROEs over the past 22 years traded at an average P/E of 25.5x and 21.3x reflecting a 
premium of 28% and 7% respectively.    





































Portfolio Ranked by Average Debt/Capital (1 = Lowest) 
Average Debt/Capital vs P/E 
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Figure 18: Source Factset 
 
 
While it may seem obvious that stocks with the best fundamentals would 
command a higher premium versus those stocks with worse fundamentals, it seems 
counterintuitive that stocks with the absolute worst fundamentals can actually trade at 
relatively high valuations.  This is mostly driven by expectations for earnings recovery 
and the value investor mind-sight, sometimes referred to as contrarian investing.  Value 
investors often invest in companies with poor prospects that are generally out-of-favor 
and “un-loved” by the crowd in hopes of a company’s fundamentals improving over time.  
These contrarian investors can be analogous to long shot horseracing bettors placing bets 
on horses with the lowest odds but highest payoffs.  Thus, stocks with the worst 
fundamental attributes actually command high valuations because investors perceive 









































Portfolio Ranked by ROE % (1 = Highest) 




Our analysis of P/E ratios over the 22 year time frame between 1990 and 2012 relative to 
performance, debt/capital ratios and ROEs suggests that investors actually seem to 
perform poorly when investing in companies with extremely strong and extremely poor 
underlying fundamentals.  In other words, investors tend to over-bet companies with the 
best fundamentals or the “sure-shots” and the worst fundamentals or the “long-shots” 
simultaneously to the point where stocks in both “tails” generated the lowest overall 
returns relative to stocks in the middle of the pack.    
 
In a related study titled “Do Financial Markets Reward Buying or Selling 
Insurance and Lottery Ticket?” Antti Ilmanen, managing director at AQR Capital 
Management LLP suggested that selling financial investments with insurance or lottery 
characteristics should earn positive long-term premiums if investors tend to overpay for 
these characteristics.  His premise was that all else being equal, investors prefer assets 
that tend to generate positive absolute returns during volatile markets and thus make their 
portfolios more positively skewed, in other words positive relative returns vis-à-vis the 
market with similar or lower levels of volatility.  Yet, since these assets are scarce, 
investors will tend to pay a high price for this characteristic.  Conversely, because 
investors dislike negative skewness, in other words negative returns vis-à-vis the market 
with similar or higher levels of volatility, they’ll require an extra reward or required risk 
premium in order to hold such an asset.  In this case, investors will tend to overly punish 
or undervalue an asset relative to its true intrinsic value.   Ilmanen goes on further to 
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suggest that investors have nonstandard preferences in that small chances of very large 
gains with almost certain but small expected losses can induce risk seeking while 
investors become risk averse when a gamble involves small chance large impact losses 
with almost certain small expected gains so much so that they pay for insurance to avoid 
such losses.  Citing work by Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010), Ilmanen suggests 
that decision makers overweight the likelihood of salient states in which lotteries and 
insurance payouts have extreme, contrasting payoffs.  He concludes, based on his own 
empirical research, that strategies that sell assets with insurance and lottery ticket like 
characteristics have delivered positive long-run rewards in a wide range of investment 
contexts.  Conversely, buying financial catastrophe insurance and holding speculative 
lottery-like investments have delivered poor long-run rewards (Ilmanen 9).    
 
We can draw a similar analogy to stocks in the S&P500.  Over the 22 years from 
1990 to 2012, investors were poorly paid relative to the market by investing in safe 
companies with near “bullet-proof” fundamentals and companies with extremely weak 
fundamentals.   This is because investors tend to be both risk averse and risk seeking in 
terms of how they perceive certain stocks.  Companies with high profitability and pristine 
balance sheets are viewed insurance protection and vehicles for capital preservation.  
Since these companies are few and rare, they tend to be over-valued as investors herd into 
their stocks.   Similarly, companies with low levels of profitability and weak balance 
sheets are viewed as lottery tickets with potential for very large gains when the market is 
trending up.  Therefore, the stocks of companies exhibiting these characteristics will tend 
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to become overvalued especially in a portfolio where investors can limit losses by taking 
small positions similar to the payoff profiles of a lottery ticket.  In fact, Ilmanen goes 
further and suggests that given most investors have constraints and limits on how much 
leverage they can assume behind an investment, investors will tend to use stocks with 
lottery ticket like characteristics as a means of enhancing returns without the use of 























THE LONG SHOT & SURE SHOT BIAS EXPLAINED BY RATIONAL CHOICE 
 
It is important to understand the critical arguments against behavioral economics. 
Most importantly, behavioral economists challenge the main tenet of Rational Choice 
theory namely that collectively, individuals will act rationally in terms of the decisions 
they make based on the information they’ve been given with regard to choices at hand.  
According to Mark Kelmon at Stanford University, rational choice theorists counter with 
four main arguments vis-à-vis behavioral economists.  First, rational choice theorists 
claim that critics often misinterpret the ends that subjects in fact are seeking by 
“observing” that they have failed to meet these ends.  In other words, if a subject makes a 
decision that seems irrational based on what we believe that subjects intent to have been, 
in fact from the perspective of that subject his or ends may seem perfectly rational.   
Second, rational choice theorists argue that while it may appear that agents are acting 
irrationally, they are in fact processing incomplete information as well as it can be 
processed.   For example, if an investor makes an investment in a company and that 
company issues a profit warning a week later sending the company’s stock down, rational 
choice theorists posit that the investor didn’t make an irrational decision but that based on 
the information at the time, he or she made a perfectly rational choice.  Third, rational 
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choice theorists suggest that while we may observe irrationality in particular settings, it 
may not be stable over time since either institutional forces or individual learning will 
overcome it over a long enough period of time.  Finally, rational choice theorists claim 
that if we observe behavior that does not meet the normative ideal of rational decision-
making, no one can improve on that behavior (Kelmon 1577-1591).    Richard Posner, 
Chief Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer at 
the University of Chicago School of Law, suggests that not only does behavioral 
economics fail to violate Rational Choice Theory but also it in fact complements the 
theory.    According to Posner, behavioral economics suggests that due to the lack of 
complete information and emotional “quirk”, people often make decisions based on 
emotional preferences rather than rational preferences.  For example, a person may 
choose to eat a lobster contentedly so long as he or she has not seen the lobster alive 
before eating it.   On the other hand, that same person may refrain from eating lobster if 
asked to pick his or her lobster from a live tank before eating it.  Behavioral economics 
would explain this as an emotional quirk but Posner suggest than an alternative 
explanation is that this person simply has different preferences for two different goods:  
One is a lobster seen only after being cooked and the other is a lobster seen before, in its 
living state, as well as after.  Similarly, our observation about the favorite and opposite 
favorite long shot bias and the violation of CAPM in the stock market may in fact 
constitute perfectly rational behavior based on difference investor preferences (Posner 
24).  For example, suppose a fund manager loses 15% of his assets due to poor 
investments but outperforms his benchmark that declines by 30% at the same time.  His 
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client is hardly going to appreciate fewer losses but is more likely going to choose to pull 
his money out of the stock market entirely to preserve capital.  In addition, hedge fund 
managers who are compensated based on absolute positive returns regardless of the 
broader stock market are highly motivated to protect capital and avoid losses.  In fact, a 
manager will likely choose to avoid losses over taking outsized risk for large gains.  
Similarly, a pension fund manager’s most important priority is preserving the value of his 
clients’ pensions rather than trying to generate significant returns.  Therefore, for most 
money managers it might be perfectly rational to avoid losses at all costs rather than 
“swinging for the fences” by over-investing in sure shot investments as a form of 
insurance against losses while investing in long shot investments as a means of 
generating lottery ticket like returns in order to keep up with meaningful up-market 
movements.  Similarly, a 65 year old retiree investing his retirement savings might have a 
preference for avoiding losses significantly more than his preference for generating 
outsized returns vis-à-vis the market while a 25 year old investor with a longer term 
investment horizon is more willing to take risk given his retirement needs are not 
necessary for 35 more years.   These differences in preferences and risk tolerance might 
actually be perfectly rational given difference market participants’ risk preferences.     
 
This difference in preference suggests that collectively investors are both risk 
averse and risk loving at the same time.  According to Jan Zabojnik, there is 
overwhelming evidence that in many situations individuals exhibit an aversion towards 
uncertainty – homeowners buy insurance, investors need to be compensated for bearing 
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risk, workers like stable employment and so on.  On the other hand, in many cases people 
appear to enjoy risk - they play the roulette wheel in casinos, buy sweepstakes, bet on 
horses and under-diversify their investment portfolios.  Zabojnik explains, “People seem 
to have conflicting preferences with regard to risk.”   In Principles of Economics, Alfred 
Marshall 1920, Marshall states “…but on the other hand, if an occupation offers a few 
extremely high prizes, its attractiveness is increased out of all proportion to their 
aggregate wage.”   Several explanations have been cited for this.  First, individuals may 
gain some “intangible” utility from the social aspects of gambling such as sitting around a 
casino or poker table with friends enjoying a laugh or two or the thrill of watching horses 
thunder around a racetrack at a horse track.  This fails to explain why individuals choose 
to play the lottery or play online poker where social interaction is minimal at best 
(Zabojnik 274-285).   
 
According to Russell Sobel and Travis Raines, rational expectations theories for 
the favorite longshot-bias can be generally grouped into two categories: risk preference 
theories and information-perception theories (Raines, Sobel 371-385).  The first group of 
theories attributes the bias to a preference for risking among gamblers.  In 1958, 
Friedman and Savage posited that consumers have a globally risk-averse utility function, 
yet over the relevant range concerning gambling and betting, the utility function becomes 
locally risk-loving.  Friedman and Savage contend that the long-shot bias adheres to the 
full rationality assumption or the expected utility framework to generate both risk-averse 
and risk-seeking behavior by the same individual. Friedman and Savage proposed a 
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utility function consisting of both concave and convex segments showing that an 
individual with preferences described by such a utility function will accept some fair 
lotteries and reject others.   The Friedman Savage utility function implies that most 
individuals derive greater utility from an increase in wealth but that up to a certain point, 
their marginal utility from rising wealth begins to diminish and taper off, as illustrated by 
the convex segments of the utility function.  According to Friedman and Savage, in 
between these to levels of wealth individuals go through a transition period where they 




individuals begin to derive greater utility for a given level of wealth and therefore 
investors’ preference for risk skews towards more risk taking with assets  
that have lottery like payoffs.  According to Friedman and Savage, it’s this interplay 
between individuals that are constantly in a state of risk averting and risk taking behavior 
that leads to this phenomenon of the favorite and opposite favorite long-shot bias in stock 
markets.  In contrast to behavioral economists, Friedman and Savage argue that this is 
perfectly rational in that as investor preference towards risk changes, so do their rational 
response to taking risk (Friedman, Savage 279-304).   
 
Another explanation using risk-preference theories to explain for the long-shot 
and sure shot bias existing at the same time might be due to the presence of different 
agents with different preferences and utility curves.  For example, a long only pension 
fund with an investment time horizon of 20-30 years and the goal of matching future plan 
beneficiary liabilities with the pension funds’ assets might be more concerned with asset 
stability and limiting downside risk rather than large returns or outperforming a 
benchmark.  In contrast, a hedge fund manager whose salary depends on one year 
performance or perhaps quarter to quarter performance versus a benchmark might be 
willing to take more risk and investment in long shots with the idea of making large 
potential gains with his clients’ money.  Downside protection may not be as important 
both because that hedge fund can protect his downside risk through hedging strategies 
such as options or given the fact that the manager is investing client assets rather than his 
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own, he might be more disposed to upside returns and less concerned with downside 
movements (Zabojnik 279).   
 
 
The illustration above shows 3 different agents’ risk curves or preference for risk.  Each 
agent is listed as C1, C2 and C3.  As shown, agent C1 has a much higher tolerance for 
risk versus agent C3.  In other words, agent C1 is willing to assume a lower level of 
return for the same level of risk as both agents C2 and C3.  Agent C3 is the least risk 
averse and demands an exponentially greater rate of return for assume even a slightly 
greater level of risk.  The point here is that C1 may act as the agent betting on the long 




risk.  In fact, agent C3’s risk free return hurdle is higher than agent C1 from the start 
suggesting that C3 won’t even begin taking risk until he has been guaranteed a minimum 
level of return from the start.    Therefore, the co-existence of the long shot and sure shot 
bias may just be function of different agents with different risk preference curves 
engaging with market at the same time.   
 
Unfortunately, recent studies conducted by Stephen LeRoy at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco suggests that even assuming a “normal” level of risk aversion 
doesn’t explain the level of stock price volatility that exists in equity markets.  According 
to Stephen LeRoy’s work, although recent research has moved away from the efficient 
capital markets assumption of “reasonable levels of risk aversion”, even after 
incorporating risk aversion into formal models, “the degree of volatility seen in the real 
world only seems implausibly high and does not satisfactorily explain the volatility of 
stock price movements.”  This observed volatility in stock prices appears to contradict 
stock market efficiency and efficient market theorists.   LeRoy notes Robert Shiller’s 
work from 1981 on stock price movements relative to changes in corporate dividends 
which suggests that stock price volatility is too high relative to the volatility in underlying 
corporate dividends under the efficient market assumption that investors have a low level 
of risk aversion (LeRoy 3).  Shiller states that the assumption that stock prices should 
equal expected future dividends independent of the volatility of dividends can be justified 
only if investor risk aversion is excluded.  If investors are risk averse, stock prices will 
depend on how variable dividends are in addition to their expected levels.  This sort of a 
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measure of market efficiency implicitly treats investors as being risk neutral.  According 
to Shiller’s work, stock price volatility implied by a given dividend model depends on 
how much information investors are assumed to have about future dividends.  If investors 
cannot predict future dividend growth, they will price stocks at a constant multiple of 
current dividends and therefore the stock price volatility relative to dividend volatility 
will be zero.  On the other hand, if investors have information about future dividends, 
then stock prices relative to dividends will vary over time.  The more information about 
dividend growth investors have, the greater the average price variation.  Therefore, the 
price volatility associated with perfect and complete information is the highest level of 
volatility that can actually occur.  In variance bound tests, Shiller and others found that 
the observed price volatility appeared to exceed this maximum level based on complete 
information thereby contradicting the efficient markets model even after eliminating the 
assumption of risk neutrality.   Shiller suggests that stocks as an asset class exhibit 
volatility that is too high relative to the volatility of underlying dividends (Shiller 24).  
Similarly, work conducted by Kevin Lansing and Stephen LeRoy in 2011 computed the 
stock price volatility implied by different levels of risk aversion.  Like Shiller, they found 
that, under normal levels of risk aversion, predicted maximum stock price volatility is 
actually much lower than what is actually seen in the market.  They also found that the 
higher the level of risk aversion, the higher the maximum stock price volatility.  
Therefore, stocks still exhibit volatility that is too high relative to efficient market 
predictive models even after making the assumption that investors are inherently risk 




A counter point to Shiller and LeRoy comes from the theory of rational 
expectations with respect to information-perception, sometimes called misperception 
theory, as a reason for why stock price volatility is so high relative to underlying dividend 
volatility even after taking into account risk-averse investor behavior.  The idea behind 
misperception theory is that investors don’t have all of the available information needed 
to accurately project a company’s future prospects.  In other words, investors rationally 
invest in stocks on expected outcomes that they believe are accurate based on the 
information they’ve been given or that they’ve been able to collect.  The information 
given is either inaccurate or incomplete or both but in the end, investors make choices 
based on misperceptions about expected future outcomes and projections.  More often 
than not, corporate executives and board members have information asymmetry as it 
relates to product demand, new products and services, and changes in corporate strategy 
such as acquisitions and divestments.  This kind of information can often lead to dramatic 
changes, positive or negative, for a company’s future prospects and therefore future 
expectations relative to expectations today.  Therefore, what may look like a long shot or 
sure shot investment in hindsight might have looked like a very attractive investment, in 
the case of the long shot, or a very poor investment, in the case of the sure shot, at that 
time based on the information at hand.   Finally, information-perception theories for the 
long-shot and sure-shot bias also suggest that bettors do not perfectly absorb information.   
In fact, Snowberg and Wolfers suggested, through studies conducted by cognitive 
psychologists, people are systematically poor at discerning between small and tiny 
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probabilities and similarly poor at discerning high and extremely likely probabilities.  
Therefore, it is the representative bettor’s inability to process information correctly that 
leads to a favorite and opposite favorite long-shot bias (Snowberg, Wofers 723-746).   
 
The point here is that while difference in risk preference curves and marginal 
utility of wealth can explain the long shot and sure shot bias in terms of rational investor 
expectations, stock prices exhibit volatility that is too high relative to underlying dividend 
and cash flow volatility.   While investors are assumed to have a normal level of risk 
aversion, data suggests that investors have a degree of risk aversion that is higher than 
what can be explained by rational expectations.   This may be a function of misperception 
theory whereby investors are making rational choices but based on incorrect or 
incomplete information.  In this case, rational expectations theory is still relevant 
although more research would need to be conducted into whether the lack of information 
or incomplete information leads to overly optimistic or overly pessimistic future 
projections.  Overly optimistic projections from misperception can help explain the long 
shot bias but not necessarily the sure shot bias.  Similarly, overly pessimistic future 
expectations based on misinformation and misperception can help explain the sure shot 












The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) states that investments with greater risk 
require greater returns from investors in order to compensate them for taking greater risk.  
Therefore, under the premise that market participants act rationally and therefore markets 
run efficiently, investments with higher risk should generate higher returns vis-à-vis 
investments with lower risk over the long run.  A plethora of academic research focused 
on this particular topic suggests that the empirical data surrounding risk and returns 
contradicts the conclusions of modern portfolio theory.  In fact, many studies suggest that 
investments with lower risk actually generate equal to or higher returns relative to 
investments with higher risk.   
 
In looking at data for the S&P 500 going back 22 years between 1990 and 2012, I 
found that there was very low correlation between risk and returns.  In fact, portfolios 
with very low risk generated commensurate to better returns versus portfolios with very 
high risk.  In addition, in general portfolios that delivered higher returns with greater risk 
did not generate high enough returns to compensate for greater risk.  In other words, there 
appears to be diminishing marginal returns with greater level of risk assumed by 
investors.  It seems that beta does a poor job of predicting future returns and measuring a 
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company’s fundamental risk.  Therefore, CAPM may be flawed in that beta does a poor 
job in capturing a stock’s true underlying risks. 
 
In looking for a better measure of risk, I looked at the fundamental characteristics 
of each company, specifically corporate profitability and balance sheet leverage, which 
are commonly used by investors in assessing the underlying quality of a company.  I 
found two important observations in looking at the empirical data.  First, companies with 
higher levels of average long term return on equity combined with lower levels of 
average balance sheet leverage tend to outperform companies with lower levels of 
profitability and higher balance sheet leverage.   This shouldn’t be a big surprise.  
Naturally, companies with better fundamentals should perform better than companies 
with relatively worse fundamentals.  Interestingly, the second observation from the data 
is that while in general, companies with high ROEs and low leverage tend to outperform 
companies with low profitability and high leverage, portfolios of those companies with 
the highest ROE and lowest leverage and portfolios of those companies with the lowest 
ROE and highest leverage actually underperform on the whole other portfolios.  In other 
words, portfolios of companies that exhibit the most extreme of characteristics in terms of 
ROE and leverage underperform portfolios of companies with more moderate 
characteristics.   
 
One plausible explanation for this underperformance at the extremes is rooted in 
behavioral economic theory known as the favorite long shot bias and the opposite 
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favorite long shot bias.  The opposite favorite long shot bias suggests that market 
participants tend to “over-bet” an asset and/or an investment with high probability of a 
payoff but low overall return if the payoff occurs, in other words, the sure winner or the 
sure bet.  In fact, market participants go so far to secure a payoff that they actually place a 
higher bet on the probability of success than the actual odds would suggest.  In stock 
market terms, investors will tend to over-value the least-riskiest stocks to the point where 
risk and return is no longer favorable.  Similar phenomenon can be observed in horse race 
betting and sports drafts.  The favorite long shot bias is the inverse of the opposite 
favorite longshot bias.  This theory suggests that market participants actually “over bet” 
an asset and/or an investment with the lowest probability of a payoff but with significant 
overall returns if the payoff occurs.  Similar phenomenon takes place in the purchase of 
insurance to insure against large potential losses with small probabilities as well as lottery 
ticket purchases.  With respect to the stock market, this is similar to an investor 
purchasing penny stocks or a high-flying company with an unproven track record with 
the idea of making large potential returns but with a highly low likelihood of success.   
 
On the other hand, rational expectations theory suggests that the existence of the 
favorite longshot bias and the opposite favorite longshot bias existing at the same time is 
actually perfectly rational and consistent with rational expectations theory.  One of the 
most of interesting explanations may be that investors are both risk loving and risk averse 
at the same time depending on their relative marginal utility for wealth.  In other words, 
an investor investing $100,000 of his personal money in the stock market may choose to 
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protect his invest from a loss at all costs, an extreme form of loss aversion, to the point 
where that investor will over-bet low risk stocks and exhibit characteristics of the 
opposite favorite long-shot bias.  At the same time, if that same investor invests $1,000 of 
his personal money in the stock market, he or she may choose to gamble and take bigger 
risks investing in penny stocks and highly risky investments with the idea of accepting a 
small loss for a significantly large payout.  In other words, at a certain point along a 
person’s marginal utility horizon, that investor will become risk loving or risk averse but 
the fact is that this investor is making a perfectly rational choice but with different levels 
of risk loving and risk averting behavior at different levels of investment.  Additionally, 
different agent with different risk preferences and marginal utility of wealth can influence 
stock prices at the extremes.  Pension investors, hedge funds, retail investors and long 
only mutual fund managers all have different investment time horizon, different long 
term and short term return expectations and therefore can have difference tolerances for 
risk and risk preference in general.   The point is that the rational expectations theory 
suggests that the long shot and sure shot bias need not be an example of irrational 
behavior but may in fact be perfectly rational.   
 
Regardless of the cause for long shot and sure shot investing, we find that the 
phenomenon of over-investing at the extremes does exist especially when looking at 
fundamental factors such as ROE and debt/capital ratios in terms of measuring risk.  We 
find that beta, in fact, does a poor job of capturing a company’s fundamental risk and 
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